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Thank you so much. Al Sommer, Dean Feerick, John Peloso;
Dean Sharon Smith; members of the Fordham Law School
community; alumni, honored guests and the many friends I see
here tonight; good evening.
It is a special thrill for me to deliver this second annual A. A.
Sommer lecture. For anyone who has followed his wonderful
careers, Al Sommer is a legend and an inspiration. From his years
of selfless public service to his brilliant work at Morgan Lewis to
his words and deeds in World War II, Al's life is a lesson in how
much can be achieved by combining a powerful mind with a
peerless heart.
Al and Starr have been wonderful friends to me over the
years-from helping me through my first terrifying months as the
youngest SEC commissioner, to Al's service on the NASD Board
when I arrived there nearly six years ago to his continuing wise
counsel today. During much of our industry's most stunning
growth, Al has been a voice-at the SEC, in the private sector, at
the Public Oversight Board and at the NASD-for doing the right
proceedings and implementation of the agency's new enforcement powers. The
report of the Task Force, "Fair and Efficient Administrative Proceedings," was
released in February 1993.
Ms. Schapiro has acted as a liaison to the U.S. Working Group of the
Group of Thirty on securities clearance and settlement matters. She was also an
active member of the Technical Committee and the Developing Markets
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO"). Through IOSCO and independently, she has worked extensively
with developing markets, particularly in Latin America and Asia, on capital
markets regulatory structure.
Before being appointed to the SEC, Ms. Schapiro was General Counsel
and Senior Vice President for the Futures Industry Association ("FIA"), an
organization of brokerage firms, domestic and international futures exchanges,
banks, law and accounting firms, and market users. She joined the FIA in 1984.
A 1977 graduate of Franklin and Marshall College (Lancaster, Pennsylvania),
Ms. Schapiro earned a Juris Doctor degree (with honors) from George
Washington University in 1980. She is a member of the District of Columbia Bar
and the American Bar Association. She is a member of the Board of Trustees
and Vice Chairman of the Audit Committee of Franklin and Marshall College,
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. She is a member of the Board of Directors of Cinergy
Corp. and Kraft Foods. Ms. Schapiro was named the Financial Women's
Association Public Sector Woman of the Year in May 2000.
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thing in the right way. Al, I am honored to honor you tonight.
I am also delighted to share in such a propitious moment for
the Fordham Law School. Dean Feerick, after two truly
distinguished decades of leadership, you will be leaving this
institution stronger than ever. And just one sign of that is the
establishment of the new corporate law center which will cement
Fordham's reputation as a forum for scholarship and practical
insight in the city whose financial markets remain the best
developed and most admired in the history of the world.
You know, I spent a long time thinking about what I should
discuss with you tonight. And before the tragedy of September,11,
there was no shortage of interesting issues on the horizon-such as
regulatory convergence in financial services; or market structure;
or technology; or globalization. But frankly, none of them seemed
sufficiently relevant and "of this moment" in an industry and a city
so profoundly affected by the terrifying events of the past two
months.
So what I would like to talk about is our future as an industry
in the wake of September 11, from the perspective of the NASD as
a self-regulatory organization with major responsibilities for
protecting investors and preserving the integrity of our markets.
This will be a policy discussion, not a requiem. But I cannot
simply launch into it without acknowledging the almost
incomprehensible grief we all feel for the loss of so many
colleagues and heroes. The cold words "human capital" cannot
begin to capture all the ways in which our friends and associates
will never be replaced.
And so much that we once took for granted has changed. The
safety of our workplaces and the security of our children. The
trepidation of boarding an airplane or taking an elevator up high in
a skyscraper. Even the previously heedless task of opening the
mail.
With so much having changed, it is tempting to think that
things will never return to normal. But while that feeling may help
to ward off any return to complacency, in the larger sense, I firmly
disagree. Because our industry can claim normalcy. It is just that
there will be a " new normal," as I call it-and it will have to differ
markedly from what preceded the tragedy.
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I am not enough of a sage to be certain whether this new
normal will be better or worse than the old. Certainly in a number
of ways it will be less convenient and more costly, at least in the
short run. But insofar as it will make us wiser about our markets
and less insular with respect to America's place in the world, I have
to believe-as an act of willed optimism-that in the long run we
will come through this crucible tempered and stronger.
No one disputes what a blow the attacks were to our industry
and our broader economy. It is too soon to have reliable numbers,
but the Securities Industry Association, among others, has done a
study showing that in our industry alone, the impact of the attacks
can be measured in many billions of dollars.' And of course,
September 11 compounded what was already a worsening
economic and employment situation.
But one truth cuts boldly against this darkening grain.
Considering all that has happened since September 11, our
securities markets have performed incredibly well. Indeed-given
the orderly trading even in the very first days after the markets
reopened-it has been nothing short of a systemic triumph.
Partly this confirms the wisdom of the investments in
infrastructure and capacity that the industry made over the
preceding decade. And partly it indicates that our system did well
in absorbing the lessons of the "Black Monday" crash of October
1987.
But in the broadest sense, it is an amazing tribute to the
confidence of investors worldwide in the fundamental soundness of
our markets. And that, I would argue, is a function of the
unwritten contract between our markets and investors that the
markets would operate fairly even in the uncharted aftermath of
September 11.
The U.S. markets have long attracted capital in times of
foreign conflicts, coups or chaos. But there had been no event to
test whether this kind of flight to quality and security would be
reversed if it were Wall Street, and not some foreign capital, that
came to resemble a war zone.
Well, the global jury is in. And the money has stayed here, in
1. See http://www.sia.com/press/html/pr-year-end.html.
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our markets. Through the attacks; through the anthrax; through
the news of rising unemployment; through it all. The world's
investors have voted with their wallets and they are saying that the
U.S. equities markets remain among the very finest havens they
can find.
One of the key factors in our markets' success and resiliency
throughout this period has been the strength of our regulatory
system. Of course, this is no cause for complacency. The long-
term future of our markets and our industry is bright only to the
extent we can honor that unwritten contract to keep investors'
interests paramount. And in meeting this imperative, self-
regulation must continue to play an indispensable role.
Self-regulation brings to bear a keen practical understanding
of the industry. It taps resources and perspectives that are not as
readily available to governments. It fosters investor protection as
well as member involvement. At its best, it is a nimble, responsive
test-bed for regulatory innovation. And it promotes high standards
that go well beyond simply obeying the law.
That is why self-regulation is so well suited to help usher in the
new normal in the securities industry. Because no one has a
stronger incentive than our member firms to ensure that their
disaster recovery and business continuity plans-to take just one
big example-are fully adequate to ensure that they can survive
and do business under adverse circumstances. And no one can
bring greater resources or expertise to bear than our industry,
acting collectively, to see that such plans are not only formulated,
but followed.
I do not want to imply that the new normal is simply a matter
of doing more to terror proof our markets and our industry. We
must do far more than prepare for a repeat of attacks such as those
of 9/11. Our efforts must encompass hardening our markets
against cyber-terror, disruptions of our mail and
telecommunications infrastructure, and natural disasters as well as
man-made ones.
But the new normal calls for changes far broader even than
these. It will also entail a comprehensive and interconnected set of
measures, some requiring increased cooperation across markets
and across borders; others involving new regulatory flexibility; and
2001]
10 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
many others drawing upon large doses of technological creativity.
Let me give you a specific sense of what I mean, starting with
what has been the NASD's bread and butter as a self-regulatory
organization in the two months since the attacks.
In dealing with an utterly unforeseen disaster, the appropriate
degree of regulatory flexibility can be a hard thing to define in
advance. With apologies to the late Justice Potter Stewart,
sometimes you just know it when you see it.'
On the 1 1 th and days following, we fielded dozens of calls from
firms needing relief from regulatory requirements, specific to their
own circumstances. We evaluated their requests in real time, and
provided tailored relief where consistent with investor protection
and market integrity.
One step the NASD took after the attacks was to expedite our
review of corporate financing filings. We extended test windows
and continuing education requirements. We granted blanket
extensions on regulatory requests for information, and expanded
them further, as appropriate, for hard-hit firms. And we made it
clear that industry professionals called into active military duty can
continue to receive transaction-based compensation- and that
while on special status, all their NASD dues and assessments will
be waived.
None of this means we abandoned our rulebook, or the goals
of investor protection and market integrity that it serves. What it
does mean is that we have exercised a good deal of commonsense
discretion as to how best to pursue these goals in the wake of the
tragedy. Under the appropriate circumstances, I would do so again
without hesitation.
Such regulatory relief may seem like largely a humanitarian
matter. But as you can well imagine, it has very practical, dollars-
and-cents consequences. A prime example involves the need of
some firms to rapidly reconstitute their offices, business and
employment arrangements in the aftermath of 9/11.
Last year, the NASD put in place new rules and procedures
designed to permit certain business expansions without obtaining
regulatory pre-review and approval. Then, when the tragedy
2. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
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struck, we devoted extra effort and human resources to processing
the most urgent membership applications on an expedited basis.
Now, going forward, we are developing operating procedures
that will harness both of these improvements. Our new
contingency plan will enable us to screen and process applications
on an urgent basis when our member firms need to merge,
consolidate or acquire branch offices; change clearing firms; or
make other changes to maintain business continuity with little
advance warning.
The benefits of such regulatory nimbleness are difficult to
quantify in advance. But we can already see that our new
procedures will shrink the time it takes to process urgent
applications from weeks to days. And in an industry where time is
money, the ability to make such changes at the speed of business-
not at the speed of regulation-makes great economic sense.
This also demonstrates why, in the new normal, regulatory
flexibility cannot be a one-time accommodation, but must become
a permanent part of the landscape. Our industry faces both
increasing demands in dealing with the terrorist threat, and
increasing cost pressures in dealing with today's economy. So if we
as self-regulators are going to sustain the strength of our unwritten
contract with investors, we must find more lasting and systematic
ways to maximize the industry's regulatory benefits while
minimizing its regulatory costs.
Fortunately, the NASD has been marching down this road for
some time now. Over the last couple of years, NASD Regulation
began the process of modernizing our rulebook with a major
retooling of several of our rules. This year, we have broadened
that effort. The goal of our Rule Modernization initiative is to
ensure that the benefits of our rules justify their burdens.
To help us in this effort, we have enlisted the assistance of a
distinguished Economic Advisory Board with a wealth of
experience in economics, finance, consumer protection and cost-
benefit analysis. Working closely with senior NASDR
management, these experts are helping us review our existing rules;
improve and modernize any we find wanting; and design a
template for enacting more streamlined and modem rules in the
future.
20011
12 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORA TE & [Vol. VII
FINANCIAL LAW
The first tranche of rules we are working through includes, for
example, rationalizing across regulatory regimes the definition of
an "institutional investor." Clearly, given the state of the industry
today, we are powerfully motivated to move this entire process
along with a real sense of urgency.
Rule modernization may lead to less prescriptive regulation in
some areas. Hopefully it will lead to better-tailored regulation
given the changes in market structure, technology and investor
base in our industry. But there is one aspect of the new normal
that will surely entail more regulation. The securities industry will
have to take on much greater responsibilities to detect and deter
money laundering and other suspicious activities.
Until now, such duties applied mostly to banks. Under the
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970,' securities firms were encouraged, but
not obligated, to file suspicious activity reports. By and large, that
status quo was accepted.
But September 11 changed everything. Money laundering
legislation in the U.S. Senate gained great impetus; and objections
to it in the House were swept away. Late last month, President
Bush signed into law an anti-terrorism bill, called the Patriot Act,"
which contains comprehensive new money laundering legislation.
The new law grants the Treasury Secretary broad discretion in
its implementation. The NASD has offered the Treasury
Department whatever assistance we can provide in the drafting of
these implementing regulations. And we are prepared to do
whatever is necessary to help our partners throughout the
government and the private sector to ensure that the new money
laundering legislation achieves its worthy goals.
Three things about the new law bear special emphasis for
tonight's purposes. The first is its breadth. The law applies to all
U.S. financial institutions that maintain even a single account for a
3. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-1124 (1970) 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-
1959, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5330 (2000).
4. The Patriot Act is the short title for the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. The Act was passed as
Pub. L. No. 107-5 115 Stat. 272. See also
http://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2001/10/1001/ 026-5/html.
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customer outside the United States. By requiring broker/dealers to
file suspicious activity reports, it makes mandatory what was
previously voluntary. And it also requires every affected
broker/dealer to establish a soup-to-nuts compliance program,
from internal policies, controls and employee training through
independent audits.
Second, the new money laundering law will require our
industry to think and talk about traditional "know your customer"
concepts in a new way. The NASD and the New York Stock
Exchange have used different terms, but meant essentially the
same thing, when we have spoken of either "suitability" or "know
your customer" obligations. In both instances, the duties have to
do with protecting the interests of investors and securities firms.
But the new money laundering law-and this is my third
point-is not primarily about protecting firms or particular
investors. It is about protecting society at large from money
laundering and other illicit uses of our financial system.
Simply put, our industry once had the luxury of not worrying
unduly about whether certain customers were not right-so long as
they were right for the investments we were recommending them.
Both of America's elected branches of government have just
spoken very plainly that our country can no longer afford that
luxury.
As you might suspect, commensurate with such major changes,
the NASD's examinations of firms for money laundering will also
change considerably. This past spring, we began working with the
SEC and NYSE to develop a joint money-laundering examination
module, and we have been conducting such examinations for
several months now. Once Treasury has promulgated its new
regulations, we will obviously take them into account in
determining how we should adapt our procedures to best examine
for compliance.
It is already quite clear that in light of 9/11 and the new law,
the securities industry is going to have to devote unprecedented
focus and attention to illicit uses of our markets generally, and
money laundering specifically.
I do not want to leave you with the impression, however, that
the new normal is only about new demands on industry (and on
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regulators for that matter), with no new resources to meet them.
Let me turn now to one very valuable growth fund for such
resources, which I mentioned earlier. It has to do with greater
cooperation and information sharing across markets, across
national borders, and across traditional lines of jurisdiction and
turf.
To extend the metaphor for just a moment, we saw this fund
achieve spectacular early returns in response to 9/11. The fiercest
of competitors cooperated like the closest of friends. This
happened on everything from sharing trading floors to sharing
strategies on trading halts to coordinating on the united reopening
of the markets.
I am not dreaming that once 9/11 has had a chance to recede
from memory a bit, the securities industry will be forever
transformed from one seen as dog-eat-dog into one in which the
lions routinely lie down with the lambs. But I am suggesting that
our industry could do far worse than to build on the spirit of civility
and cooperation that bloomed in the wake of the tragedy.
This is much more than an emotional point. Just as the attacks
have spurred a realization that U.S. law enforcement authorities
must cooperate far better with one another and their counterparts
around the world, so must a concomitant realization spread among
regulators and firms throughout the global financial services
industry.
All of us have more to do in the new normal, from terror-
proofing our markets to helping halt money laundering in its
tracks. The only way we can do it, under the tightening cost
pressures that are already being felt throughout the industry, is if
we all leverage our resources more effectively - with less concern
for whose turf or initiative may be at issue, and more concern for
what will get the job done.
Looking forward, that statement applies to the NASD, the
other self-regulatory organizations, the SEC, the states and the
industry. It applies to sharing suspicions about questionable
trading activity or traders. It means we should reach out to our
counterparts in the banking industry and among the banking
regulators who have a great deal of experience dealing with money
laundering issues. And we should help our government put a full
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court press on the many countries that have been ducking their
obligations in this area for far too long.
Here too, my point can be simply summarized. The financial
markets are rightly known as a forum for all-out competition. But
that competition should be played out in the field of stocks and
bonds, profit and loss. When it comes to meeting the new dangers,
obligations and challenges of the new normal, we will all do better
working not with our elbows out, but our arms linked.
I spoke earlier of the increased terror proofing and disaster
hardening our industry will have to undergo. This need is as
important as it is obvious. Let me address a couple of specific
aspects, starting with disaster recovery.
It will not surprise you to learn that in the wake of tragedy, the
NASD was interested to learn whether our member firms had
plans in place to deal with such issues as data back-up and
recovery, financial and operational assessments, alternative
communications, regulatory reporting, investor access, business
continuity and the like.
So we took a small survey to find out. And what we learned is
that all of the firms we surveyed did have disaster recovery or
business continuity plans in place.
Now we are taking the next step: conducting a greatly
expanded second survey that will be far more statistically
meaningful-a true reflection of industry readiness in the face of
potential catastrophe. In an area as critical as this, our duty as self-
regulators demands that we be armed with facts, not conjecture.
By taking this step, we are not primarily looking to judge the
value of any individual firm's plan, but rather, to assess the overall
readiness of the industry to continue operating and protecting
investor interests during an emergency. A clearer understanding
of what the industry is doing in this area could form the basis for a
set of best practices whose widespread acceptance would bring
added strength to the markets and confidence to investors.
Of course, the NASD's own readiness for disruptive events is
being beefed up as a result of the tragedy. For example, we are
pulling together an emergency operations manual to capture for
future readiness the key procedures we had to formulate in real
time in the hours and days after 9/11. And we have begun to build
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situation rooms where our senior managers in Washington can be
linked with counterparts elsewhere in responding rapidly to an
event.
Speaking of linkages, there is a broader need in our
interdependent industry to maintain the best possible emergency
contact networks, including among the NASD and our 5,600
member firms. If our industry is to maintain our unwritten
contract with investors, we must never fail to provide them access
to their brokers and their accounts-without uncertainty and
without delay.
So, while something like the maintenance of absolutely current
and complete emergency contact information may seem
ministerial, in fact it is vital. And not only as a matter of terror-
proofing, but of improved cooperation, market resiliency, and
investor confidence as well.
There is an even more obvious need, in an emergency, to
ensure the survival of firms' books and records. This brings us to
the cross-cutting issue of technology-the last subject I would like
to discuss with you tonight before taking your questions.
The immediate aftermath of 9/11 has already provided some
impressive examples of technological creativity in action.
Brokerage firms were able to patch together back-up data in
innovative ways. Clearing firms used the time while the market
was closed to reduce system risk. Stock exchanges cobbled
together temporary trading floors in a matter of days.
For our part, the NASD was able to begin posting critical
information on our Web Site within hours, regarding everything
from regulatory relief to investor advice to a clearinghouse that
allowed firms needing office space to find firms that could make
space available.
Many of these are examples of unprecedented cooperation.
But they have all been crucially enabled by new uses of technology
as well. I would like to put a couple of ideas on the table, involving
NASD technology, that I believe could help expand these trends
and make them a more permanent part of the new normal.
Several of you have heard me talk about the great potential of
a system we have been developing for some time now, called
INSITE. By using a sophisticated analytical engine, data mining
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and pattern recognition, INSITE will allow us to base our
brokerage firm examinations on compliance risk, not on the
calendar. The upshot is quite practical. Better focus on where the
real risks exist. More timely alerts to potential red flags. Less
compliance burden for the overwhelming majority of member
firms who run a tight ship.
And consider this added benefit, which today looms larger
than ever. If technology such as INSITE can enable us to examine
our member firms with less need for our physical presence, it can
not only decrease regulatory burdens, but increase regulatory
certainty-by ensuring that we can get our job done regardless of
any weak links in the transportation system, including air travel.
Similar data mining and pattern detection capabilities are
found in our market surveillance technology, called the Advanced
Detection System, or ADS. Over time, such tools should enable us
to target our surveillance to look for signs of money laundering, or
even to provide advance warning of potential terrorist trading
activity or other attempted market manipulation.
Finally, there is Web CRD-the Central Registration
Depository that is the largest such system, bar none, on the
Internet. September 11 underscored the vulnerability of our
industry's paper books and records; and many firms have realized,
if they had not understood already, how expensive and
cumbersome it is to duplicate all essential books and records.
That is why it makes so much sense for the CRD to serve as
the "gold source" for the books and records of our member firms,
thereby transferring a substantial burden from them to us. So we
are working with the SEC, other self-regulatory organizations, the
states and the industry to see if certain NASD records systems-
which are fully backed up and have disaster recovery facilities-
can serve as firms' official books and records. This will reduce
overall industry costs by centralizing a necessary function. Even
more important, it will reduce reliance on vulnerable paper
records, without reducing regulatory oversight for us or
operational capability for our firms.
Before I stop for your questions, let me take up one potential
objection I can imagine coming from Cheyenne, Wyoming or
Topeka, Kansas or any other smaller city that might seem very far
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removed from the possibility of being a direct target of terror.
Brokers in such cities might feel, at first blush, that after 9/11 they
are being asked to bear costs and inconveniences that actually have
very little to do with them.
While I might understand that feeling, it does not stand up to
closer inspection.
First, as evident from my discussion of CRD, Rule
Modernization and several other subjects indicates, many of the
things I have talked about today will in the long run save the
industry money by increasing efficiencies and reducing burdens.
Second, giving yourself some margin for error by expecting the
unexpected is a habit that almost always, sooner or later, pays off.
One key example is Y2K-derided by some as an expensive non-
event, but explicitly credited by several of the respondents to our
survey with providing the impetus for business continuity plans
that they found invaluable after September 11.
And finally, it should be clear by now that disasters are an
equal opportunity threat that know no borders, and that terrorism
also has been democratized. Every brokerage firm, however small
or remote, depends on infrastructure systems that can fail, and
receives mail that has passed through a big-city post office.
Now, I am not talking about curling up into some kind of
survivalist's defensive crouch. But it should be clearer than ever
that in the new normal-as in the old-no one is immune from the
possibility of unforeseen business disruptions. It is just that now
we can imagine the unimaginable. So we should take seriously the
many lessons we have learned from the tragedy. And take heart
from all the reasonable steps we can take to apply them.
You know, we have all discovered a great deal about our
world and our country in the last nine weeks.
We have had to confront within our own borders what an
oxymoron the term "holy war" is.
We have learned that a single zealot-infected by hate-is the
most potent biological weapon of all.
And we have been reminded yet again that it is when times are
toughest that Americans are at their best.
That is a lesson the greatest generation of Al Sommer knew in
its bones and etched in stone with its sacrifice.
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And it is one we will reflect on and reaffirm often in the
months and years to come.
Our industry and our nation will face our challenges with
purpose, without panic, but also without complacency.
If we are faithful to the spirit of service that is found at this law
school-and which imbues the entire life and career of Al
Sommer-then we will act with every bit of wisdom and courage
that we need. And thus reclaim, with every step forward, what has
rightly been called the quiet miracle of a normal life.
Thank you very much.
Notes & Observations
